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We consider an environment where players are involved in a public goods game and must decide repeatedly
whether to make an individual contribution or not. However, players lack strategically relevant information
about the game and about the other players in the population. The resulting behavior of players is completely
uncoupled from such information, and the individual strategy adjustment dynamics are driven only by reinforce-
ment feedbacks from each player’s own past. We show that the resulting “directional learning” is sufficient to
explain cooperative deviations away from the Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept of k−strong equilib-
ria, which nest both the Nash equilibrium and the Aumann-strong equilibrium as two special cases, and we show
that, together with the parameters of the learning model, the maximal k−strength of equilibrium determines the
stationary distribution. The provisioning of public goods can be secured even under adverse conditions, as long
as players are sufficiently responsive to the changes in their own payoffs and adjust their actions accordingly.
Substantial levels of public cooperation can thus be explained without arguments involving selflessness or social
preferences, solely on the basis of uncoordinated directional (mis)learning.
Cooperation in sizable groups has been identified as one
of the pillars of our remarkable evolutionary success. While
between-group conflicts and the necessity for alloparental
care are often cited as the likely sources of the other-regarding
abilities of the genus Homo [1, 2], it is still debated what made
us the “supercooperators” that we are today [3, 4]. Research
in the realm of evolutionary game theory [5–10] has identified
a number of different mechanisms by means of which coop-
eration might be promoted [11, 12], ranging from different
types of reciprocity and group selection to positive interac-
tions [13], risk of collective failure [14], and static network
structure [15, 16].
The public goods game [17], in particular, is established
as an archetypical context that succinctly captures the social
dilemma that may result from a conflict between group inter-
est and individual interests [18, 19]. In its simplest form, the
game requires that players decide whether to contribute to a
common pool or not. Regardless of the chosen strategy by the
player himself, he receives an equal share of the public good
which results from total contributions being multiplied by a
fixed rate of return. For typical rates of return it is the case
that, while the individual temptation is to free-ride on the con-
tributions of the other players, it is in the interest of the col-
lective for everyone to contribute. Without additional mecha-
nisms such as punishment [20], contribution decisions in such
situations [18, 19] approach the free-riding Nash equilibrium
[21] over time and thus lead to a “tragedy of the commons”
[22]. Nevertheless, there is rich experimental evidence that
the contributions are sensitive to the rate of return [23] and
positive interactions [13], and there is evidence in favor of the
fact that social preferences and beliefs about other players’ de-
cisions are at the heart of individual decisions in public goods
environments [24].
In this paper, however, we shall consider an environment
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where players have no strategically relevant information about
the game and/ or about other players, and hence explanations
in terms of social preferences and beliefs are not germane. In-
stead, we shall propose a simple learning model, where play-
ers may mutually reinforce learning off the equilibrium path.
As we will show, this phenomenon provides an alternative and
simple explanation for why contributions rise with the rate of
return, as well as why, even under adverse conditions, public
cooperation may still prevail. Previous explanations of this ex-
perimental regularity [18] are based on individual-level costs
of ‘error’ [25, 26].
Suppose each player knows neither who the other players
are, nor what they earn, nor how many there are, nor what
they do, nor what they did, nor what the rate of return of the
underlying public goods game is. Players do not even know
whether the underlying rate of return stays constant over time
(even though in reality it does) because their own payoffs
are changing due to the strategy adjustments of other play-
ers, about which they have no information. Without any such
knowledge, players are unable to determine ex ante whether
contributing or not contributing is the better strategy in any
given period, i.e., players have no strategically relevant infor-
mation about how to respond best. As a result, the behavior
of players has to be completely uncoupled [27, 28], and their
strategy adjustment dynamics are likely to follow a form of
reinforcement [29, 30] feedback or, as we shall call it, direc-
tional learning [31, 32]. We note that, in our model, due to the
one-dimensionality of the strategy space, reinforcement and
directional learning are both adequate terminologies for our
learning model. Since reinforcement applies also to general
strategy spaces and is therefore more general we will prefer
the terminology of directional learning. Indeed, such direc-
tional learning behavior has been observed in recent public
goods experiments [33, 34]. The important question is how
well will the population learn to play the public goods game
despite the lack of strategically relevant information. Note
that well here has two meanings due to the conflict between
private and collective interests: on the one hand, how close
will the population get to playing the Nash equilibrium, and,
2on the other hand, how close will the population get to playing
the socially desirable outcome.
The learning model considered in this paper is based on a
particularly simple “directional learning” algorithm which we
shall now explain. Suppose each player plays both cooper-
ation (contributing to the common pool) and defection (not
contributing) with a mixed strategy and updates the weights
for the two strategies based on their relative performances in
previous rounds of the game. In particular, a player will in-
crease its weight on contributing if a previous-round switch
from not contributing to contributing led to a higher realized
payoff or if a previous-round switch from contributing to not
contributing led to a lower realized payoff. Similarly, a player
will decrease its weight on contributing if a previous-round
switch from contributing to not contributing led to a higher
realized payoff or if a previous-round switch from not con-
tributing to contributing led to a lower realized payoff. For
simplicity, we assume that players make these adjustments
at a fixed incremental step size δ, even though this could
easily be generalized. In essence, each player adjusts its
mixed strategy directionally depending on a Markovian per-
formance assessment of whether a previous-round contribu-
tion increase/decrease led to a higher/lower payoff.
Since the mixed strategy weights represent a well-ordered
strategy set, the resulting model is related to the directional
learning/ aspiration adjustment models [31, 32, 35], and simi-
lar models have previously been proposed for bid adjustments
in assignment games [36], as well as in two-player games
[37]. In [36] the dynamic leads to stable cooperative outcomes
that maximize total payoffs, while Nash equilibria are reached
in [37]. The crucial difference between these previous stud-
ies and our present study is that our model involves more than
two players in a voluntary contributions setting, and, as a re-
sult, that there can be interdependent directional adjustments
of groups of players including more than one but not all the
players. This can lead to uncoordinated (mis)learning of sub-
populations in the game.
Consider the following example. Suppose all players in a
large standard public goods game do not contribute to start
with. Then suppose that a player in a subpopulation uncoor-
dinatedly but by chance simultaneously decide to contribute.
If this group is sufficiently large (the size of which depends
on the rate of return), then this will result in higher payoffs
for all players including the contributors, despite the fact that
not contributing is the dominant strategy in terms of unilat-
eral replies. In our model, if indeed this generates higher
payoffs for all players including the freshly-turned contrib-
utors, then the freshly-turned contributors would continue to
increase their probability to contribute and thus increase the
probability to trigger a form of stampede or herding effect,
which may thus lead away from the Nash equilibrium and to-
wards a socially more beneficial outcome.
Our model of uncoordinated but mutually reinforcing de-
viations away from Nash provides an alternative explanation
for the following regularity that has been noted in experiments
on public goods provision [18]. Namely, aggregate contri-
bution levels are higher the higher the rate of return, despite
the fact that the Nash equilibrium remains unchanged (at no-
contribution). This regularity has previously been explained
only at an individual level, namely that ‘errors’ are less costly
– and therefore more likely – the higher the rate of return, fol-
lowing quantal-response equilibrium arguments [25, 26]. By
contrast, we provide a group-dynamic argument. Note that
the alternative explanation in terms of individual costs is not
germane in our setting, because we have assumed that players
have no information to make such assessments. It is in this
sense that our explanation perfectly complements the expla-
nation in terms of costs.
In what follows, we present the results, where we first set up
the model and then deliver our main conclusions. We discuss
the implications of our results in section 3. Further details
about the applied methodology are provided in the Methods
section.
Results
Public goods game with directional learning
In the public goods game, each player i in the population
N = 1, 2, ..., n chooses whether to contribute (ci = 1) or not
to contribute (ci = 0) to the common pool. Given a fixed
rate of return r > 0, the resulting payoff of player i is then
ui = (1−ci)+(r/n)∗
∑
j∈N cj . We shall call r/n the game’s
marginal per-capita rate of return and denote it as R. Note
that for simplicity, but without loss of generality, we have as-
sumed that the group is the whole population. In the absence
of restrictions on the interaction range of players [38], i.e., in
well-mixed populations, the size of the groups and their for-
mation can be shown to be of no relevance in our case, as long
as R rather than r is considered as the effective rate of return.
The directional learning dynamics is implemented as fol-
lows. Suppose the above game is infinitely repeated at time
steps t = 0, 1, 2, ..., and suppose further that i, at time t, plays
cti = 1 with probability pti ∈ [δ, 1− δ] and cti = 0 with proba-
bility (1 − pti). Let the vector of contribution probabilities pt
describe the state of the game at time t. We initiate the game
with all p0i lying on the δ-grid between 0 and 1, while subse-
quently individual mixed strategies evolve randomly subject
to the following three “directional bias” rules:
upward: if ui(cti) > ui(c
t−1
i ) and cti > c
t−1
i , or if ui(cti) <
ui(c
t−1
i ) and cti < c
t−1
i , then p
t+1
i = p
t
i + δ if pti < 1;
otherwise, pt+1i = pti.
neutral: if ui(cti) = ui(c
t−1
i ) and/or cti = c
t−1
i , then p
t+1
i =
pti , p
t
i+δ, or p
t
i−δ with equal probability if 0 < pti < 1;
otherwise, pt+1i = pti.
downward: if ui(cti) > ui(ct−1i ) and cti < c
t−1
i , or if
ui(c
t
i) < ui(c
t−1
i ) and cti > c
t−1
i , then p
t+1
i = p
t
i − δ if
pti > 0; otherwise, p
t+1
i = p
t
i.
Note that the second, neutral rule above allows random de-
viations from any intermediate probability 0 < pi < 1. How-
ever, pi = 0 and pi = 1 for all i are absorbing state candi-
dates. We therefore introduce perturbations to this directional
3learning dynamics and study the resulting stationary states. In
particular, we consider perturbations of order ǫ such that, with
probability 1 − ǫ, the dynamics is governed by the original
three “directional bias” rules. However, with probability ǫ, ei-
ther pt+1i = pti, p
t+1
i = p
t
i − δ or p
t+1
i = p
t
i + δ happens
equally likely (with probability ǫ/3) but of course obeying the
pt+1i ∈ [0, 1] restriction.
Provisioning of public goods
We begin with a formal definition of the k−strong equilib-
rium. In particular, a pure strategy imputation s∗ is a k-strong
equilibrium of our (symmetric) public goods game if, for all
C ⊆ N with |C| ≤ k, ui(s∗C ; s∗N\C) ≥ ui(s
′
C ; s
∗
N\C) for all
i ∈ C for any alternative pure strategy set s′C for C. As noted
in the previous section, this definition bridges, one the one
hand, the concept of the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
[21] in the sense that any k−strong equilibrium with k > 0
is also a Nash equilibrium, and, on the other hand, that of the
(Aumann-)strong equilibrium [39, 40] in the sense that any
k−strong equilibrium with k = n is Aumann strong. Equi-
libria in between (for 1 < k < n) are “more stable” than
a Nash equilibrium, but “less stable” than an Aumann-strong
equilibrium.
The maximal k-strengths of the equilibria in our public
goods game as a function of r are depicted in Fig. 1 for
n = 16. The cyan-shaded region indicates the “public bad
game” region for r < 1 (R < 1/n), where the individual
and the public motives in terms of the Nash equilibrium of
the game are aligned towards defection. Here ci = 0 for
all i is the unique Aumann-strong equilibrium, or in terms
of the definition of the k−strong equilibrium, ci = 0 for all
i is k−strong for all k ∈ [1, n]. The magenta-shaded re-
gion indicates the typical public goods game for 1 < r < n
(1/n < R < 1), where individual and public motives are con-
flicting. Here there exists no Aumann-strong equilibria. The
outcome ci = 0 for all i is the unique Nash equilibrium, and
that outcome is also k-strong equilibrium for some k ∈ [1, n),
where the size of k depends on r and n in that ∂k/∂r ≤ 0
while ∂k/∂n ≥ 0. Finally, the gray-shaded region indicates
the unconflicted public goods game for r > n (R > 1), where
individual and public motives are again aligned, but this time
towards cooperation. Here ci = 1 for all i abruptly becomes
the unique Nash and Aumann-strong equilibrium, or equiva-
lently the unique k−strong equilibrium for all k ∈ [1, n].
If we add perturbations of order ǫ to the unperturbed public
goods game with directional learning that we have introduced
in section 2, there exist stationary distributions of pi and the
following proposition can be proven. In the following, we
denote by “k” the maximal k−strength of an equilibrium.
Proposition: As t → ∞, starting at any p0, the expectation
with respect to the stationary distribution is E[pt] >
1/2 if R ≥ 1 and E[pt] < 1/2 if R < 1. ∂E[pt]/∂ǫ <
0 if R ≥ 1, and ∂E[pt]/∂ǫ > 0 if R < 1. Moreover,
∂E[pt]/∂δ > 0, and ∂E[pt]/∂δ < 0 if R ≥ 1. Finally,
∂E[pt]/∂k < 0 if R < 1.
0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1
  ci=0 for all i  ci=1 for all i
public good, alignedpublic good, conflicting
public bad, aligned
r
 
R
c i 
fo
r a
ll 
i i
s 
at
 m
os
t k
-s
tro
ng
 fo
r k
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 321
 
FIG. 1: The maximal k-strength of equilibria in the studied public
goods game with directional learning. As an example, we consider
the population size being n = 16. As the rate of return r increases
above 1, the Aumann-strong (n−strong) ci = 0 for all i (full defec-
tion) equilibrium looses strength. It is still the unique Nash equilib-
rium, but its maximal strength is bounded by k = 17 − r. As the
rate of return r increases further above n (R > 1), the ci = 1 for all
i (full cooperation) equilibrium suddenly becomes Aumann-strong
(n−strong). Shaded regions denote the public bad game (r < 1),
and the public goods games with conflicting (1 < r < n) and aligned
(R > 1) individual and public motives in terms of the Nash equilib-
rium of the game (see main text for details). We note that results for
other population and/or group sizes are the same over R, while r and
the slope of the red line of course scale accordingly.
We begin the proof by noting that the perturbed process
given by our dynamics results in an irreducible and aperi-
odic Markov chain, which has a unique stationary distribution.
When ǫ = 0, any absorbing state must have pti = 0 or 1 for
all players. This is clear from the positive probability paths
to either extreme from intermediate states given by the unper-
turbed dynamics. We shall now analyze whether pti = 0 or 1,
given that ptj = 0 or 1 for all j 6= i, has a larger attraction
given the model’s underlying parameters.
If R ≥ 1, the probability path for any player to move from
pti = 0 to p
t+T
i = 1 in some T = 1/δ steps requires a single
perturbation for that player and is therefore of the order of a
single ǫ. By contrast, the probability for any player to move
from pti = 1 to p
t+T
i = 0 in T steps is of the order ǫ3, because
at least two other players must increase their contribution in
order for that player to experience a payoff increase from his
non-contribution. Along any other path or if pt is such that
there are not two players j with ptj = 0 to make this move,
then the probability for i to move from pti = 1 to pt+Ti = 0
in T steps requires even more perturbations and is of higher
order. Notice that, for any one player to move from pti = 0
to pt+Ti = 1 we need at least two players to move away from
pti = 0 along the least-resistance paths. Because contributing
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FIG. 2: Color-encoded average contribution levels in the unperturbed
public goods game with directional learning. Simulations confirm
that, with little directional learning sensitivity (i.e. when δ is zero
or very small), for the marginal per-capita rate of return R > 1 the
outcome ci = 1 for all i is the unique Nash and Aumann-strong equi-
librium. For R = 1 (dashed horizontal line), any outcome is a Nash
equilibrium, but only ci = 1 for all i is Aumann-strong while all
other outcomes are only Nash equilibria. For R < 1, ci = 0 for all i
is the unique Nash equilibrium, and its maximal k−strength depends
on the population size. This is in agreement with results presented
in Fig. 1. Importantly, however, as the responsiveness of players in-
creases, contributions to the common pool become significant even in
the defection-prone R < 1−region. In effect, individuals’ (mis)learn
what is best for them and end up contributing even though this would
not be a unilateral best reply. Similarly, in the R > 1 region free-
riding starts to spread despite of the fact that it is obviously better
to cooperate. For both these rather surprising and counterintuitive
outcomes to emerge, the only thing needed is directional learning.
1 is a best reply for all R ≥ 1, those two players will also
continue to increase if continuing to contribute 1. Notice that
the length of the path is T = 1/δ steps, and that the path
requires no perturbations along the way, which is less likely
the smaller δ.
If R < 1, the probability for any player to move from
pti = 1 to p
t+T
i = 0 in some T = 1/δ steps requires a sin-
gle perturbation for that player and is therefore of the order
of a single ǫ. By contrast, the probability for any player to
move from pti = 0 to p
t+T
i = 1 in some T steps is at least
of the order ǫk, because at least k players (corresponding to
the maximal k-strength of the equilibrium) must contribute in
order for all of these players to experience a payoff increase.
Notice that k decreases in R. Again, the length of the path is
T = 1/δ steps, and that path requires no perturbations along
the way, which is less likely the smaller δ. With this, we con-
clude the proof of the proposition. However, it is also worth
noting a direct corollary of the proposition; namely, as ǫ→ 0,
E[pt]→ 1 if R ≥ 1, and E[pt]→ 0 if R < 1.
Lastly, we simulate the perturbed public goods game with
directional learning and determine the actual average contri-
bution levels in the stationary state. Color encoded results in
dependence on the normalized rate of returnR and the respon-
siveness of players to the success of their past actions δ (alter-
natively, the sensitivity of the individual learning process) are
presented in Fig. 2 for ǫ = 0.1. Small values of δ lead to
a close convergence to the respective Nash equilibrium of the
game, regardless of the value ofR. As the value of δ increases,
the pure Nash equilibria erode and give way to a mixed out-
come. It is important to emphasize that this is in agreement, or
rather, this is in fact a consequence of the low k−strengths of
the non-contribution pure equilibria (see Fig 1). Within inter-
mediate to large δ values the Nash equilibria are implemented
in a zonal rather than pinpoint way. When the Nash equilib-
rium is such that all players contribute (R > 1), then small
values of δ lead to more efficient aggregate play (recall any
such equilibrium is n−strong). Conversely, by the same logic,
when the Nash equilibrium is characterized by universal free-
riding, then larger values of δ lead to more efficient aggregate
play. Moreover, the precision of implementation also depends
on the rate of return in the sense that uncoordinated devia-
tions of groups of players lead to more efficient outcomes the
higher the rate of return. In other words, the free-riding prob-
lem is mitigated if group deviations lead to higher payoffs for
every member of an uncoordinated deviation group, the mini-
mum size of which (that in turn is related to the maximal k−
strength of equilibrium) is decreasing with the rate of return.
Simulations also confirm that the evolutionary outcome is
qualitatively invariant to: i) The value of ǫ as long as the lat-
ter is bounded away from zero, although longer convergence
times are an inevitable consequence of very small ǫ values
(see Fig. 3); ii) The replication of the population (i.e., mak-
ing the whole population a group) and the random remixing
between groups; and iii) The population size, although here
again the convergence times are the shorter the smaller the
population size. While both ii and iii are a direct consequence
of the fact that we have considered the public goods game in a
well-mixed rather than a structured population (where players
would have a limited interaction range and where thus pat-
tern formation could play a decisive role [38]), the qualita-
tive invariance to the value of ǫ is elucidated further in Fig. 3.
We would like to note that by “qualitative invariance” it is
meant that, regardless of the value of ǫ > 0, the population al-
ways diverges away from the Nash equilibrium towards a sta-
ble mixed stationary state. But as can be observed in Fig. 3,
the average contribution level and its variance both increase
slightly as ǫ increases. This is reasonable if one considers ǫ as
an exploration or mutation rate. More precisely, it can be ob-
served that, the lower the value of ǫ, the longer it takes for the
population to move away from the Nash equilibrium where
everybody contributes zero in the case that 1/n < R < 1
(which was also the initial condition for clarity). However, as
soon as initial deviations (from pi = 0 in this case) emerge
(with probability proportional to ǫ), the neutral rule in the
original learning dynamics takes over, and this drives the pop-
ulation towards a stable mixed stationary state. Importantly,
even if the value of ǫ is extremely small, the random drift
sooner or later gains momentum and eventually yields simi-
lar contribution levels as those attainable with larger values of
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FIG. 3: Time evolution of average contribution levels, as obtained
for R = 0.7, δ = 0.1 and different values of ǫ (see legend). If only
ǫ > 0, the Nash equilibrium erodes to a stationary state where at
least some members of the population always contribute to the com-
mon pool. There is a discontinuous transition to complete free-riding
(defection) as ǫ → 0. Understandably, the lower the value of ǫ (the
smaller the probability for the perturbation), the longer it may take
for the drift to gain on momentum and for the initial deviation to
evolve towards the mixed stationary state. Note that the time hori-
zontally is in logarithmic scale.
ǫ. Most importantly, note that there is a discontinuous jump
towards staying in the Nash equilibrium, which occurs only
if ǫ is exactly zero. If ǫ is bounded away from zero, then the
free-riding Nash equilibrium erodes unless it is n−strong (for
very low values of R ≤ 1/n).
Discussion
We have introduced a public goods game with directional
learning, and we have studied how the level of contributions to
the common pool depends on the rate of return and the respon-
siveness of individuals to the successes and failures of their
own past actions. We have shown that directional learning
alone suffices to explain deviations from the Nash equilibrium
in the stationary state of the public goods game. Even though
players have no strategically relevant information about the
game and/ or about each others’ actions, the population could
still end up in a mixed stationary state where some players
contributed at least part of the time although the Nash equilib-
rium would be full free-riding. Vice versa, defectors emerged
where cooperation was clearly the best strategy to play. We
have explained these evolutionary outcomes by introducing
the concept of k−strong equilibria, which bridge the gap be-
tween Nash and Aumann-strong equilibria. We have demon-
strated that the lower the maximal k−strength and the higher
the responsiveness of individuals to the consequences of their
own past strategy choices, the more likely it is for the popu-
lation to (mis)learn what is the objectively optimal unilateral
(Nash) play.
These results have some rather exciting implications. Fore-
most, the fact that the provisioning of public goods even un-
der adverse conditions can be explained without any sophis-
ticated and often lengthy arguments involving selflessness or
social preference holds promise of significant simplifications
of the rationale behind seemingly irrational individual behav-
ior in sizable groups. It is simply enough for a critical number
(depending on the size of the group and the rate of return)
of individuals to make a “wrong choice” at the same time
once, and if only the learning process is sufficiently fast or
naive, the whole subpopulation is likely to adopt this wrong
choice as their own at least part of the time. In many real-
world situations, where the rationality of decision making is
often compromised due to stress, propaganda or peer pres-
sure, such “wrong choices” are likely to proliferate. As we
have shown in the context of public goods games, sometimes
this means more prosocial behavior, but it can also mean more
free-riding, depending only on the rate of return.
The power of directional (mis)learning to stabilize unilater-
ally suboptimal game play of course takes nothing away from
the more traditional and established explanations, but it does
bring to the table an interesting option that might be appealing
in many real-life situations, also those that extend beyond the
provisioning of public goods. Fashion trends or viral tweets
and videos might all share a component of directional learn-
ing before acquiring mainstream success and recognition. We
hope that our study will be inspirational for further research
in this direction. The consideration of directional learning in
structured populations [41, 42], for example, appears to be a
particularly exciting future venture.
Methods
For the characterization of the stationary states, we intro-
duce the concept of k−strong equilibria, which nests both
the Nash equilibrium [21] and the Aumann-strong equilib-
rium [39, 40] as two special cases. While the Nash equi-
librium describes the robustness of an outcome against uni-
lateral (1-person) deviations, the Aumann-strong equilibrium
describes the robustness of an outcome against the deviations
of any subgroup of the population. An equilibrium is said to
be (Aumann-)strong if it is robust against deviations of the
whole population or indeed of any conceivable subgroup of
the population, which is indeed rare. Our definition of the
k−strong equilibrium bridges the two extreme cases, measur-
ing the size of the group k ≥ 1 (at or above Nash) and hence
the degree to which an equilibrium is stable. We note that
our concept is related to coalition-proof equilibrium [43, 44].
In the public goods game, the free-riding Nash equilibrium is
typically also more than 1−strong but never n−strong. As we
will show, the maximal strength k of an equilibrium translates
directly to the level of contributions in the stationary distribu-
tion of our process, which is additionally determined by the
normalized rate of return R and the responsiveness of players
to the success of their past actions δ, i.e., the sensitivity of the
individual learning process.
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